Central America 1914
by Jamie Bisher
Guatemala
Guatemala had
cowered under the iron fist of Manuel Estrada Cabrera since 1898. He was an ambitious, young—41 year old—Minister
of Interior when he took control of the government in the panicky aftermath of
the assassination of President José María Reyna Barrios. The economy was in a shambles and political
violence was rife. Estrada Cabrera was a
hardnosed lawyer who knew how to expertly manipulate events and opponents to
his advantage, twisting the law to justify oppressive measures while rallying
support by touting himself as heir to a Liberal reformation begun in 1871. He resuscitated the economy and instilled a
heavy-handed law and order that attracted foreign investors yet bred internal
dissension.
Guatemala suffered from El Presidente’s delusions of grandeur, but did enjoy new national holidays on the birthdays of Estrada Cabrera and his mother. He erected facsimiles of Greek temples throughout the country, proclaimed Guatemala City the Athens of Central America and instituted annual Fiestas de Minerva to celebrate erudition, especially his own, in a society where 90% of the populace was illiterate and many did not understand Spanish, the lingua franca of commerce, education and government. When volcano Santa Maria erupted and spawned a series of violent earthquakes that threatened to disrupt the 1902 Fiesta de Minerva in Quetzaltenango, El Presidente issued a decree declaring that the volcanic eruption, heavy ash rains and tremors were not happening, demonstrating his shallow sensitivity for the people of his own hometown as well as his sense of omnipotence.
Estrada Cabrera recast the mold of classic Central American dictator. He edged out civilian provincial administrators by creating a parallel security structure of reliable military commanders who could whip up loyalty, conscripts and “volunteer” laborers. He wooed the small growing working class by establishing a university for them, and also wooed a steady stream of mistresses. However, the bulk of the mostly Maya Indian population continued to toil in virtual serfdom, squalor and illiteracy, their daily rituals unchanged since pre-Columbian times.
Estrada Cabrera tolerated no genuine opposition. The repression in Guatemala nourished an underground that spread roots internationally with political exiles who fled to Mexico, El Salvador and the United States. Small cliques of toadying military and police officials and an elite oligarchy shared the booty of Estrada Cabrera’s corruption, but lists published by overseas opposition groups grew each year with the names of dissident military officers, men of commerce and other professionals who fell victim to the regime’s secret police and death squads. For example, a 1908 assassination attempt by a young cadet triggered a series of executions at the elite military academy, the Escuela Politécnica, and even prompted the academy’s closing for a spell. The regime mastered the use of terror, which infected the populace through whispers of medieval tortures and dismembered corpses of even prominent citizens.
Guatemala suffered from El Presidente’s delusions of grandeur, but did enjoy new national holidays on the birthdays of Estrada Cabrera and his mother. He erected facsimiles of Greek temples throughout the country, proclaimed Guatemala City the Athens of Central America and instituted annual Fiestas de Minerva to celebrate erudition, especially his own, in a society where 90% of the populace was illiterate and many did not understand Spanish, the lingua franca of commerce, education and government. When volcano Santa Maria erupted and spawned a series of violent earthquakes that threatened to disrupt the 1902 Fiesta de Minerva in Quetzaltenango, El Presidente issued a decree declaring that the volcanic eruption, heavy ash rains and tremors were not happening, demonstrating his shallow sensitivity for the people of his own hometown as well as his sense of omnipotence.
Estrada Cabrera recast the mold of classic Central American dictator. He edged out civilian provincial administrators by creating a parallel security structure of reliable military commanders who could whip up loyalty, conscripts and “volunteer” laborers. He wooed the small growing working class by establishing a university for them, and also wooed a steady stream of mistresses. However, the bulk of the mostly Maya Indian population continued to toil in virtual serfdom, squalor and illiteracy, their daily rituals unchanged since pre-Columbian times.
Estrada Cabrera tolerated no genuine opposition. The repression in Guatemala nourished an underground that spread roots internationally with political exiles who fled to Mexico, El Salvador and the United States. Small cliques of toadying military and police officials and an elite oligarchy shared the booty of Estrada Cabrera’s corruption, but lists published by overseas opposition groups grew each year with the names of dissident military officers, men of commerce and other professionals who fell victim to the regime’s secret police and death squads. For example, a 1908 assassination attempt by a young cadet triggered a series of executions at the elite military academy, the Escuela Politécnica, and even prompted the academy’s closing for a spell. The regime mastered the use of terror, which infected the populace through whispers of medieval tortures and dismembered corpses of even prominent citizens.
Several more assassination attempts fueled Estrada Cabrera’s paranoia and led him to build a vast network of informers, spies, and hitmen throughout Guatemala and Central America and even in distant centers of opposition like New Orleans, New York and Mexico City. Historians Lester Langley and Thomas Schoonover wrote, “Estrada Cabrera’s spies and henchmen were everywhere… A prominent figure in the anti-Estrada Cabrera movement was shot down on a San Salvador street in circumstances suggesting the handiwork of the Guatemalan’s notorious spy network…” The prime objective of Guatemalan intelligence was to combat opposition to Estrada Cabrera at home and abroad, and, when possible, to extend his influence into other Central American nations.
All foreigners were closely watched by Estrada Cabrera’s secret police and their vast network of orejas—informants (literally “ears”). Guatemala’s foreign colony numbered approximately 12,000 people in 1911. It included the wealthiest and most powerful German community in Central America, which controlled a number of prominent coffee plantations and trading firms. German investments had begun in 1828 when Carl Rudolph Klee, a bold Hanover merchant, and his English partner George Skinner began exporting raw materials to Europe. By 1868, there were one hundred Germans living in Guatemala, and by the turn of the century there were one thousand men, women and children. Their presence permeated the Guatemalan economy, from the dirt where the coffee trees flowered, through the riverine and railroad transportation systems, through the banks, Finance Ministry offices and Palácio Nacional, to the freight forwarding and customs offices in the ports. Guatemala’s economic health relied heavily on German expatriates.
All foreigners were closely watched by Estrada Cabrera’s secret police and their vast network of orejas—informants (literally “ears”). Guatemala’s foreign colony numbered approximately 12,000 people in 1911. It included the wealthiest and most powerful German community in Central America, which controlled a number of prominent coffee plantations and trading firms. German investments had begun in 1828 when Carl Rudolph Klee, a bold Hanover merchant, and his English partner George Skinner began exporting raw materials to Europe. By 1868, there were one hundred Germans living in Guatemala, and by the turn of the century there were one thousand men, women and children. Their presence permeated the Guatemalan economy, from the dirt where the coffee trees flowered, through the riverine and railroad transportation systems, through the banks, Finance Ministry offices and Palácio Nacional, to the freight forwarding and customs offices in the ports. Guatemala’s economic health relied heavily on German expatriates.
British Honduras
The colony of British Honduras—the present day nation of Belize—perched in the Caribbean mangroves and Maya Mountains that roughly paralleled her disputed border with Guatemala. Belize’s meager population of just under 50,000 souls consisted of fiercely independent logcutters, smugglers and subsistence farmers descended from pirates, slaves, fugitives and Mayan warriors. Some British colonial officials dreaded postings to this sleepy Caribbean backwater, and dubbed it “the slum of the Empire.”
Guatemala did not merely dispute the boundary of British Honduras; Guatemala disputed the very existence of the colony. Guatemalan demagogues (past and present) coveted Belíce and claimed it as part of their country’s inheritance from Spain’s colonial empire. These territorial claims were muddled by an 1859 treaty in which Great Britain promised to build a road connecting Guatemala City to the Caribbean in exchange for Guatemala relinquishing the untamed wilderness that became British Honduras. After second thoughts, Great Britain decided not to build the promised road to the Caribbean, which would have also paved the way for an easy Guatemalan invasion in case of hostilities, but decided to keep the territory anyway. Thus Guatemala grudgingly carved its own outlet to the Caribbean, finally completing a railroad to Puerto Barrios in 1908.
The primary threats to the little colony’s security came from Guatemalan invasion threats, rebellions of Yucatecan Mayas spilling over the Mexican border, and wild schemes. To arouse patriotic rage, Guatemalan politicians occasionally rattled sabres about reclaiming their lost territory but mostly seemed content to print maps that embraced Belíce within Guatemalan borders. Indeed, Guatemala and British Honduras even pondered cooperation on a joint security matter in August 1910 when bandits made their mutual frontier a no man’s land, however both governments soon backed down, daunted by the logistics of the manhunt rather than political issues.
Instability across the Mexican border posed a regular threat. Several bloody incidents had occurred since the first in 1848 when agitated Bacalar Indians attacked Belizean woodcutters near the frontier. Armies of Yucatecan Mayas battled the Mexican government for decades, each side torturing and murdering men, women and children en masse and treading into British Honduras either in pursuit or retreat. Some Indian clans, such as the notorious Tzul family, took advantage of the isolated intersection of the Mexican, Guatemalan and British Honduran borders to make a livelihood as desperadoes in the wilds. In addition, mercenaries and rebels availed themselves of the unpopulated backwoods and islets to stage forces for attacks on Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico, most recently in July 1910, when ousted Honduran President Manuel Bonilla used Glovers Reef as an assembly point for gun-runners from Alabama and Mississippi and about 30 filibusters.
The primary threats to the little colony’s security came from Guatemalan invasion threats, rebellions of Yucatecan Mayas spilling over the Mexican border, and wild schemes. To arouse patriotic rage, Guatemalan politicians occasionally rattled sabres about reclaiming their lost territory but mostly seemed content to print maps that embraced Belíce within Guatemalan borders. Indeed, Guatemala and British Honduras even pondered cooperation on a joint security matter in August 1910 when bandits made their mutual frontier a no man’s land, however both governments soon backed down, daunted by the logistics of the manhunt rather than political issues.
Instability across the Mexican border posed a regular threat. Several bloody incidents had occurred since the first in 1848 when agitated Bacalar Indians attacked Belizean woodcutters near the frontier. Armies of Yucatecan Mayas battled the Mexican government for decades, each side torturing and murdering men, women and children en masse and treading into British Honduras either in pursuit or retreat. Some Indian clans, such as the notorious Tzul family, took advantage of the isolated intersection of the Mexican, Guatemalan and British Honduran borders to make a livelihood as desperadoes in the wilds. In addition, mercenaries and rebels availed themselves of the unpopulated backwoods and islets to stage forces for attacks on Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico, most recently in July 1910, when ousted Honduran President Manuel Bonilla used Glovers Reef as an assembly point for gun-runners from Alabama and Mississippi and about 30 filibusters.
Lastly, British Honduras was an odd piece of real estate with strange demographics that frequently inspired unconventional schemes. For example, in 1914 a proposal was floated in the United States Senate to buy British Honduras and trade it with a sum of money to Mexico for Baja California and part of Sonora Desert. The coming years of chaos would produce wilder schemes.
El Salvador
Although
military and diplomatic reports often characterized El Salvador as
“anti-American” based on its legacy of association with Nicaragua’s ousted
Zelaya regime, the country’s politics were (in the words of Sylvanus Morley) purely a “family affair”—a dynasty of the
Melendez clan with more plot twists than an Italian opera. There were no powerful US exporters like the fruit companies in El Salvador,
but foreign commerce depended upon American steamship lines. National intelligence focused firstly on
keeping the Melendez family in power, secondly on supporting various factions
within the family against competing factions.
El Salvador also had
long-range aspirations to “unite” with Honduras,
meaning, in the baldest analysis of Salvadoran intentions, to take over Honduras by
friendly diplomatic means. The greatest
external threat came from Guatemalan dictator Estrada Cabrera whose ambition
and paranoia threatened anyone who opposed him in Central
America.
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Honduras
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, Honduras was the battlefield of rival dictators Zelaya of Nicaragua and Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala in a raw struggle for power that drew in ambitious politicians, mercenaries and opportunistic investors. Along with each change in power in Tegucigalpa came rewards of concessions to supporters. After years of fighting against Honduran caudillos and generals backed by Zelaya, a pro-US populist named Manuel Bonilla became president in 1912, ushering in a period of relative tranquility. (As for the supposedly idealistic Nicaraguan dictator Zelaya, historians Langley and Schoonover noted, “Policarpo [Bonilla] had rendered Zelaya an inestimable service by allowing Nicaraguan concessionaires to operate in the expanse of thicket and coast between the Segovia and Patuca rivers…”) Bonilla died a natural death one year later, his two best mercenaries at his bedside, and Honduras enjoyed a lawful transition of the presidency to Francisco Bertrand. A distrusting Bertrand canned the mercenaries but retained Bonilla’s close relationship with the budding US fruit exporters that were growing banana plantations and company towns on Honduras’ north coast.
US banana companies were a potent political force in Honduras, especially the Vaccaro Brothers Company of New Orleans. In the port of La Ceiba, for example, Vaccaro Brothers owned local banks, steamships and the strategic “wireless radio” station in addition to large plantations nearby, and dominated local commerce and power. Similar company towns dotted Central America’s Caribbean coast from Guatemala to Costa Rica.
The biggest threats to Honduras’ security were posed by her neighbors. El Salvadoran politicos wistfully entertained ideas of union with Honduras, with more populous El Salvador as the equal above equals, of course. Border disputes simmered with Nicaragua and Guatemala, though the latter was more dangerous after Zelaya’s ouster from Managua. Guatemalan dictator Estrada Cabrera provocatively sent his troops into the disputed territory on occasion to test the will of President Bertrand to hold on to the land. These forays could have easily sparked open war between Honduras and Guatemala if Honduran troops acted against them.
US banana companies were a potent political force in Honduras, especially the Vaccaro Brothers Company of New Orleans. In the port of La Ceiba, for example, Vaccaro Brothers owned local banks, steamships and the strategic “wireless radio” station in addition to large plantations nearby, and dominated local commerce and power. Similar company towns dotted Central America’s Caribbean coast from Guatemala to Costa Rica.
The biggest threats to Honduras’ security were posed by her neighbors. El Salvadoran politicos wistfully entertained ideas of union with Honduras, with more populous El Salvador as the equal above equals, of course. Border disputes simmered with Nicaragua and Guatemala, though the latter was more dangerous after Zelaya’s ouster from Managua. Guatemalan dictator Estrada Cabrera provocatively sent his troops into the disputed territory on occasion to test the will of President Bertrand to hold on to the land. These forays could have easily sparked open war between Honduras and Guatemala if Honduran troops acted against them.
Nicaragua
1914 found Nicaragua saddled with a US occupation
army amid the aftershock of decades of regional political turmoil. The turmoil had begun in 1844 as competing caudillos in Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras—and shifting alliances of local autocrats—fought to
unite and dominate Central America. They
relied largely on small pressgang armies of peasant infantry, which gave
numerical advantage to populous Guatemala
and El Salvador. The
tides of war in Central America were easily
turned by spies, turncoats and small cadres of mercenary weapons specialists,
tacticians and warriors. The pool of
potential mercenaries expanded greatly after the 1848 discovery of gold in
distant California spurred motley herds of
prospectors from the Eastern US to take shortcuts across Nicaragua on their frantic migrations from Atlantic to Pacific.
A diminutive Tennessean, William Walker had raised a 300-man contingent
of North American mercenaries for Liberal presidential contender Francisco
Castellon in 1855, and eventually became president himself for a short time
before ending up in front of a Honduran firing squad on September 11,
1860. Apart from mercenaries, the
presence of large numbers of alien transients injected foreign interference
into the constant domestic turmoil that already churned Nicaraguan
politics.
Pre-World War I Nicaragua was shaped by the sixteen-year dictatorship of José Santos Zelaya. He was born to a coffee family that was wealthy enough to send him to a French university. When thirty years of Conservative domination ended in political confusion in 1893, Zelaya and his Liberal faction emerged triumphant. As president, Zelaya built roads and schools, jailed enemies, and got even richer from tribute, kickbacks and concessions. He aspired “to unify” Central America, built up the army and imported foreign military and intelligence experts. In 1909, 17 of Nicaragua’s 73 generals (generales de división and generales de brigada) were foreigners, and the nationalities represented in the ranks of colonel and above included Mexican, Honduran, Costa Rican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, Colombian, Cuban, Belgian, French, US and German. Zelaya’s brutality and stranglehold on power inspired scores of attempted coups and failed uprisings.
His own son Alfonso rebelled against him. Cadet Zelaya abandoned the US Military Academy to pursue a romance with the daughter of a Washington physician. Zelaya’s agents in Washington kidnapped and sequestered the young man in an attempt to make him drop the girl and return to West Point, and, when that failed, transported him to Managua to confront his father. However, the dictator’s son chose love, got married in 1907 and took a job playing the piano in a Washington saloon. One wonders what bitterness the tyrant harbored against the country that turned his warrior-son into a lovesick saloon musician. Later that year Nicaraguan meddling compelled the State Department to convene an international conference to avoid a general war in Central America. (A contemporary political scientist called Zelaya “one of the most arrant military lordlets and meddlers that Central America had produced in a long time,” the ringleader of a fractious, bellicose alliance of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, all “under chieftains, military and juristic,” that sought to unify Central America by sword.)
Zelaya’s relationship with the US was no less complicated than his relationship with Alfonso. Like other caudillos, Zelaya had regularly employed yanqui mercenaries. However he angered the US public when he brashly executed two captured gringos, Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce, who had been captured while trying to plant mines in the San Juan River for anti-Zelayista rebels. US warships appeared off the Nicaraguan coast in mid-November 1909 and Zelaya was finally ousted a month later.
To most observers outside of Nicaragua’s Conservative party, the United States’ altruistic peace-keeping efforts looked like imperialist intervention. During the next three years US troops landed a number of times for short periods to restore order or to protect businesses in ports where fighting between rebels and government troops raged. Adolfo Díaz, the former officer of a US-owned mining property, helped finance Zelaya’s ouster by Conservative Party rebels and, after a short stint as vice president, became president of Nicaragua in 1911. He presided over an anarchic political landscape that exploded in a new round of civil war on May 31, 1912. Fighting between Liberal and Conservative factions intensified through the summer until 2,500 US Marines landed in August. Though vastly outnumbered, the Marines took over the railway, threw their weight behind Díaz and the Conservatives, and forced a semblance of calm upon Nicaragua at gunpoint. Most of the troops withdrew in January 1913, but the Legation Guard that remained became the guarantor of peace for the next twelve years. Díaz was “elected” president in a sham election in 1913 that was engineered by the American Legation. US companies loaned Díaz’ administration the princely sum of $15 million, prompting charges that he had sold his country to Washington. Regardless of the loan, Conservative control of the country relied upon the Legation Guard in Managua and the timely visits of American warships. US diplomats refereed squabbles between ambitious Conservative contenders, and declared Washington’s sincere intentions to restore peace and a healthy economic climate so that Nicaraguans could repay their North American creditors.
Pre-World War I Nicaragua was shaped by the sixteen-year dictatorship of José Santos Zelaya. He was born to a coffee family that was wealthy enough to send him to a French university. When thirty years of Conservative domination ended in political confusion in 1893, Zelaya and his Liberal faction emerged triumphant. As president, Zelaya built roads and schools, jailed enemies, and got even richer from tribute, kickbacks and concessions. He aspired “to unify” Central America, built up the army and imported foreign military and intelligence experts. In 1909, 17 of Nicaragua’s 73 generals (generales de división and generales de brigada) were foreigners, and the nationalities represented in the ranks of colonel and above included Mexican, Honduran, Costa Rican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, Colombian, Cuban, Belgian, French, US and German. Zelaya’s brutality and stranglehold on power inspired scores of attempted coups and failed uprisings.
His own son Alfonso rebelled against him. Cadet Zelaya abandoned the US Military Academy to pursue a romance with the daughter of a Washington physician. Zelaya’s agents in Washington kidnapped and sequestered the young man in an attempt to make him drop the girl and return to West Point, and, when that failed, transported him to Managua to confront his father. However, the dictator’s son chose love, got married in 1907 and took a job playing the piano in a Washington saloon. One wonders what bitterness the tyrant harbored against the country that turned his warrior-son into a lovesick saloon musician. Later that year Nicaraguan meddling compelled the State Department to convene an international conference to avoid a general war in Central America. (A contemporary political scientist called Zelaya “one of the most arrant military lordlets and meddlers that Central America had produced in a long time,” the ringleader of a fractious, bellicose alliance of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, all “under chieftains, military and juristic,” that sought to unify Central America by sword.)
Zelaya’s relationship with the US was no less complicated than his relationship with Alfonso. Like other caudillos, Zelaya had regularly employed yanqui mercenaries. However he angered the US public when he brashly executed two captured gringos, Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce, who had been captured while trying to plant mines in the San Juan River for anti-Zelayista rebels. US warships appeared off the Nicaraguan coast in mid-November 1909 and Zelaya was finally ousted a month later.
To most observers outside of Nicaragua’s Conservative party, the United States’ altruistic peace-keeping efforts looked like imperialist intervention. During the next three years US troops landed a number of times for short periods to restore order or to protect businesses in ports where fighting between rebels and government troops raged. Adolfo Díaz, the former officer of a US-owned mining property, helped finance Zelaya’s ouster by Conservative Party rebels and, after a short stint as vice president, became president of Nicaragua in 1911. He presided over an anarchic political landscape that exploded in a new round of civil war on May 31, 1912. Fighting between Liberal and Conservative factions intensified through the summer until 2,500 US Marines landed in August. Though vastly outnumbered, the Marines took over the railway, threw their weight behind Díaz and the Conservatives, and forced a semblance of calm upon Nicaragua at gunpoint. Most of the troops withdrew in January 1913, but the Legation Guard that remained became the guarantor of peace for the next twelve years. Díaz was “elected” president in a sham election in 1913 that was engineered by the American Legation. US companies loaned Díaz’ administration the princely sum of $15 million, prompting charges that he had sold his country to Washington. Regardless of the loan, Conservative control of the country relied upon the Legation Guard in Managua and the timely visits of American warships. US diplomats refereed squabbles between ambitious Conservative contenders, and declared Washington’s sincere intentions to restore peace and a healthy economic climate so that Nicaraguans could repay their North American creditors.
Costa Rica
Costa Rica was
spared much of the bloodshed that retarded development in neighboring
states. Its’ political evolution had
centered upon four competing city-states, Conservative Heredia and Cartago, and
Liberal San Jose and Alajuela, however colonial institutions had never grown
deep roots, and the Liberals predominated early on. North American filibusters under William
Walker were repelled in the 1850s and a cholera epidemic claimed 10% of the
population, but the country was fortunate to be ruled by benevolent dictators
who built a thriving coffee export economy.
The country developed into a budding democracy, although Costa Rica’s
congress disqualified the winner of an inconclusive 1914 plebiscite and named
its own man, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, to the presidency.
Costa Rica had already established the reputation of peace and stability that continues today. The country was spared the sharp class and racial divisions that tormented other Latin American nations. Most Costa Ricans were small landowners of Spanish descent with some modicum of education. When idealists established a Central American Court of Justice in 1907, “it seemed both logical and fitting to locate it in Costa Rica.” As in other Central American countries, German investments dominated public utilities, the high technology of the era.
Costa Rica had already established the reputation of peace and stability that continues today. The country was spared the sharp class and racial divisions that tormented other Latin American nations. Most Costa Ricans were small landowners of Spanish descent with some modicum of education. When idealists established a Central American Court of Justice in 1907, “it seemed both logical and fitting to locate it in Costa Rica.” As in other Central American countries, German investments dominated public utilities, the high technology of the era.
Panama
Though not independent until 1903, Panama’s geographic isolation from the rest of Colombia had long set it apart. In fact, as far back as 1840, Panama had seceded from Colombia for 13 months. Panama seceded from Colombia November 18, 1840 and was reincorporated on December 31, 1841. Also, between 1855 and 1886, the constitution of Nueva Grenada (as the country called itself until 1861 when it became Colombia) allowed Panama and its nine sister provinces to organize themselves as sovereign states. Foreigners’ dreams of an isthmian canal changed Panama’s destiny in the mid-nineteenth century. Although racked by the same interminable Liberal-Conservative strife that bloodied continental Colombian provinces, civil war in Panama was stoked by the additional combustible of canal politics, sometimes overt, usually covert. For example, when some garrison commanders opted for the Liberals in the Colombian Civil War of 1884, they were bolstered by roughneck transients from many lands who had gathered in hopes of lucrative canal-digging jobs, and who avidly sacked Colon in early April 1885, destroying the city and inducing foreign warships to restore the peace.
Though not
independent until 1903, Panama’s geographic isolation from the rest of Colombia had
long set it apart. In fact, as far back
as 1840, Panama had seceded
from Colombia
for 13 months. Panama seceded from Colombia November 18, 1840 and was reincorporated on December 31, 1841. Also, between 1855 and 1886, the constitution of Nueva Grenada (as the country called itself until 1861 when it became Colombia) allowed Panama and its nine sister provinces to organize themselves as sovereign states. Foreigners’ dreams of an isthmian canal
changed Panama’s destiny in the mid-nineteenth century. Although racked by the same interminable
Liberal-Conservative strife that bloodied continental Colombian provinces,
civil war in Panama
was stoked by the additional combustible of canal politics, sometimes overt,
usually covert. For example, when some
garrison commanders opted for the Liberals in the Colombian Civil War of 1884,
they were bolstered by roughneck transients from many lands who had gathered in
hopes of lucrative canal-digging jobs, and who avidly sacked Colon in early April 1885, destroying the
city and inducing foreign warships to restore the peace.
In 1901, the United States and Great Britain signed the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. It scrapped the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty that required joint control of any isthmian canal and gave the US permission to build, control and fortify the future canal. In January 1903, US Secretary of State John Hay convinced Tomas Herran, Colombia’s representative in Washington, to sign the Hay-Herran Treaty—a 100-year renewable lease to a canal zone six miles wide across Panama in exchange for $10 million and $250,000 annual rent after the first nine years. Unfortunately, the Colombian government changed its mind in hopes of negotiating a more lucrative deal, and canal proponents sought a way around Bogotá’s obstruction, repeated double-crossing and deliberate procrastination.
Panamanian separatists and aggressive US boosters of the isthmian canal, led by President Theodore Roosevelt, forged a marriage of convenience in 1903 to create a new state. In March 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt told the War Department to send “two or three Army officers” on an undercover intelligence-gathering mission through Colombia and the Colombian province that would soon secede to become Panama. Captain Chauncey B. Humphrey and Second Lieutenant Grayson M.P. Murphy, a fresh graduate of West Point, were initially detailed as military attachés in Caracas until July 1903, when they disappeared on their covert mission. They reappeared in the White House on October 16, 1903 to give President Roosevelt a briefing on “the Caribbean situation.”
On November 3, Dr. Manuel Amador declared a revolt against Colombia in Panama City. Amador’s revolt was a controversial “revolution” during which Americans prevented the transit of Colombian troops over the Panama Railway and US marines came ashore. Independence was declared on November 4, Washington gave diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government on November 6, and on November 18 Secretary of State Hay concluded a canal treaty with the new republic’s first minister to Washington, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French stockholder in the New Panama Canal Company. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla agreement granted the United States a ten-mile wide canal zone in perpetuity and other rights that made Panama essentially a US protectorate. The Senate quickly granted approval and canal construction began. Roosevelt would bluntly declare years later, “I took Panama, and left Congress to debate it.”
1914 found the new republic under the presidency of Belisario Porras. He was a 58 year old lawyer, journalist and long-time Liberal nationalist who contrasted sharply with the other iron-fisted leaders of Central America, and dedicated his term to improving his country’s health and sanitation facilities. Geographic isolation from the troubles of neighboring regions, the wealth that the new canal infused and the support of the United States favored Panama.
In 1901, the United States and Great Britain signed the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. It scrapped the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty that required joint control of any isthmian canal and gave the US permission to build, control and fortify the future canal. In January 1903, US Secretary of State John Hay convinced Tomas Herran, Colombia’s representative in Washington, to sign the Hay-Herran Treaty—a 100-year renewable lease to a canal zone six miles wide across Panama in exchange for $10 million and $250,000 annual rent after the first nine years. Unfortunately, the Colombian government changed its mind in hopes of negotiating a more lucrative deal, and canal proponents sought a way around Bogotá’s obstruction, repeated double-crossing and deliberate procrastination.
Panamanian separatists and aggressive US boosters of the isthmian canal, led by President Theodore Roosevelt, forged a marriage of convenience in 1903 to create a new state. In March 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt told the War Department to send “two or three Army officers” on an undercover intelligence-gathering mission through Colombia and the Colombian province that would soon secede to become Panama. Captain Chauncey B. Humphrey and Second Lieutenant Grayson M.P. Murphy, a fresh graduate of West Point, were initially detailed as military attachés in Caracas until July 1903, when they disappeared on their covert mission. They reappeared in the White House on October 16, 1903 to give President Roosevelt a briefing on “the Caribbean situation.”
On November 3, Dr. Manuel Amador declared a revolt against Colombia in Panama City. Amador’s revolt was a controversial “revolution” during which Americans prevented the transit of Colombian troops over the Panama Railway and US marines came ashore. Independence was declared on November 4, Washington gave diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government on November 6, and on November 18 Secretary of State Hay concluded a canal treaty with the new republic’s first minister to Washington, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French stockholder in the New Panama Canal Company. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla agreement granted the United States a ten-mile wide canal zone in perpetuity and other rights that made Panama essentially a US protectorate. The Senate quickly granted approval and canal construction began. Roosevelt would bluntly declare years later, “I took Panama, and left Congress to debate it.”
1914 found the new republic under the presidency of Belisario Porras. He was a 58 year old lawyer, journalist and long-time Liberal nationalist who contrasted sharply with the other iron-fisted leaders of Central America, and dedicated his term to improving his country’s health and sanitation facilities. Geographic isolation from the troubles of neighboring regions, the wealth that the new canal infused and the support of the United States favored Panama.
Panama Canal Zone
The
security of Panama was
guaranteed by the Canal Zone, a sliver of
territory ten miles wide that bisected the republic that had been created to
host it. As of April 1, 1914, the area
was administered by a Canal Zone Government that fell under the US Secretary of
War (the government had been established by Executive Order 1885 of January 27, 1914). In July 1914, the Zone’s long-term North
American residents had just begun moving into homes and offices at Ancon,
Culebra, Empire and other towns so new that landscapers had not transformed the
muddy construction sites into gardens yet.
Of course, the presence of the Canal Zone also made Panama a strategic
target under perpetual threat of attack.
The Canal Zone Police employed North Americans and deployed undercover officers from its headquarters at Ancon to tail suspicious passengers debarking from vessels calling at ports in the zone. By the time the US entered the world war, US Army officers were manning a Military Intelligence Office in Ancon that communicated directly with the War Department in Washington, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) operated a similar operation nearby. They coordinated with Canal Zone Police and could distribute bulletins and lookouts for suspects and fishy activities, as well as running agents, gathering and reporting information, answering queries from military and diplomatic officials, and managing mail drops. Transient intelligence officers and agents could enjoy the luxuries of the US Government-owned Tivoli Hotel before plunging into the pestilence-infested wilds of rural Latin American missions.
A grand celebration to officially open the Panama Canal on August 15, 1914 was scratched due to the outbreak of war in Europe. The SS Ancon, a canal company cement ship, quietly made the inaugural passage with no international dignitaries to witness the historic transit. Meanwhile the great powers of the Old World plunged eagerly into a bloodbath. That very day, German artillery completed the brutal demolition of Belgium’s fortress at Liege, firing poisonous gas shells upon the ruins as a message to others who dared defy the Kaiser’s army. The French Army was holding off the Hun invaders at Dinant, and Japan, Great Britain’s ally in the Far East, issued an ultimatum demanding Germany’s evacuation from Tsing-Tao, China. The New World was applying new technologies for prosperity and to bring the world closer together, while the Old World seemed bent on self-destruction.
The Canal Zone Police employed North Americans and deployed undercover officers from its headquarters at Ancon to tail suspicious passengers debarking from vessels calling at ports in the zone. By the time the US entered the world war, US Army officers were manning a Military Intelligence Office in Ancon that communicated directly with the War Department in Washington, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) operated a similar operation nearby. They coordinated with Canal Zone Police and could distribute bulletins and lookouts for suspects and fishy activities, as well as running agents, gathering and reporting information, answering queries from military and diplomatic officials, and managing mail drops. Transient intelligence officers and agents could enjoy the luxuries of the US Government-owned Tivoli Hotel before plunging into the pestilence-infested wilds of rural Latin American missions.
A grand celebration to officially open the Panama Canal on August 15, 1914 was scratched due to the outbreak of war in Europe. The SS Ancon, a canal company cement ship, quietly made the inaugural passage with no international dignitaries to witness the historic transit. Meanwhile the great powers of the Old World plunged eagerly into a bloodbath. That very day, German artillery completed the brutal demolition of Belgium’s fortress at Liege, firing poisonous gas shells upon the ruins as a message to others who dared defy the Kaiser’s army. The French Army was holding off the Hun invaders at Dinant, and Japan, Great Britain’s ally in the Far East, issued an ultimatum demanding Germany’s evacuation from Tsing-Tao, China. The New World was applying new technologies for prosperity and to bring the world closer together, while the Old World seemed bent on self-destruction.
A grand celebration to officially open the Panama Canal on August 15, 1914 was scratched due to the outbreak of war in Europe. The SS Ancon, a canal company cement ship, quietly made the inaugural passage with no international dignitaries to witness the historic transit. Meanwhile the great powers of the Old World plunged eagerly into a bloodbath. That very day, German artillery completed the brutal demolition of Belgium’s fortress at Liege, firing poisonous gas shells upon the ruins as a message to others who dared defy the Kaiser’s army. The French Army was holding off the Hun invaders at Dinant, and Japan, Great Britain’s ally in the Far East, issued an ultimatum demanding Germany’s evacuation from Tsing-Tao, China. The New World was applying new technologies for prosperity and to bring the world closer together, while the Old World seemed bent on self-destruction.
Go to Mexico 1914 Go to Caribbean 1914 Go to Andean Republics 1914 Go to ABC Republics Go to Venezuela and Guianas
Copyright 2018, Jamie Bisher.